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Abstract. Security is an important issue that needs to be taken into account at 
all stages of information system development, including early requirements 
elicitation. Early analysis of security makes it possible to predict threats and 
their impacts and define adequate security requirements before the system is in 
place. Security requirements are difficult to elicit, analyze, and manage. The 
fact that analysts’ knowledge about security is often tacit makes the task of 
security requirements elicitation even harder. Ontologies are known for being a 
good way to formalize knowledge. Ontologies, in particular, have been proved 
useful to support reusability. Requirements engineering based on predefined 
ontologies can make the job of requirement engineering much easier and faster. 
However, this very much depends on the quality of the ontology that is used. 
Some security ontologies for security requirements have been proposed in the 
literature. None of them stands out as complete. This paper presents a core and 
generic security ontology for security requirements engineering. Its core and 
generic status is attained thanks to its coverage of wide and high-level security 
concepts and relationships. We implemented the ontology and developed an 
interactive environment to facilitate the use of the ontology during the security 
requirements engineering process. The proposed security ontology was 
evaluated by checking its validity and completeness compared to other 
ontologies. Moreover, a controlled experiment with end-users was performed to 
evaluate its usability.  
Keywords: Security, ontology, concepts, security requirements, elicitation. 
1 Introduction 
Security has moved from being considered by Information Systems (IS) designers as 
a technical topic to becoming a critical issue in our society [1]. With the growing 
digitization of activities, IS are getting more and more complex. They must comply 
with new usages, varied needs, and are permanently exposed to new vulnerabilities. 
There is no single week without an announcement indicating that the IS of some 
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private or public organization was attacked. The cost of cybercrime in 2012 reached 
$110B in the world [2]. It has been reported recently that attacks to sensitive data 
increased by 62% in 2013 with 253 incidents observed and 552 million identities 
stolen [44]. A major obstacle that faces analysts, and requirements engineers, is the 
fact that knowledge about security is most often tacit, imprecisely defined and non-
formalized. Among the challenges for security projects is the difficulty of expressing 
security requirements and producing exhaustive specifications. A requirement 
prescribes a condition judged necessary for the system [3]. Security Requirements 
Engineering (SRE) methods derive security requirements using specific concepts, 
borrowed from security engineering paradigms [4]. It is well known that ontologies 
are useful for representing and inter-relating many types of knowledge of a same 
domain. Thus, the research community of information system security [5] urged the 
necessity of having a good security ontology to harmonize the vaguely defined 
terminology, leading to communication troubles between stakeholders. The benefits 
of such a security ontology would be manifold: it would help requirements engineers 
reporting incidents more effectively, reusing security requirements of the same 
domain and discussing issues together, for instance [6]. Several research studies have 
addressed the issue of knowledge for the field of security [7][8]. The research 
presented in this paper is part of a larger ongoing research project that aims at 
proposing a method that exploits ontologies for security requirements engineering [9]. 
In [9], a small security ontology was first used for the elicitation and analysis of 
security requirements.  Being “small”, the ontology used affected the resulting 
requirements and the whole security requirements analysis process.  In a previous 
research, several security ontologies were compared and classified [7]. The paper 
concluded that ontologies are good sources for security requirements engineering. 
However the quality of the resulting security requirements depends greatly on  
the ontologies used during the elicitation and analysis process. To cope with the 
aforementioned issues, this paper proposes a core security ontology that considers  
the descriptions of the most important concepts related to security requirements and 
the relationships among them. “Core” refers to the union of knowledge (high-level 
concepts, relationships, attributes) present in other security ontologies proposed in the 
literature. As Massacci et al. claims, “Although there have been several proposals for 
modeling security features, what is still missing are models that focus on high-level 
security concerns without forcing designers to immediately get down to security 
mechanisms”[15]. Meta-models can be useful since they provide an abstract syntax of 
security concepts. However, we believe that ontologies can be a better option since 
they allow representing, accessing, using and inferring about that knowledge in order 
to develop methods, techniques, and tools for security requirements analysis. 
According to [16], a good security ontology should inter alia include static knowledge 
(concepts, relationships and attributes), and dynamic knowledge (axioms). It must be 
reusable (commented in natural language, and formalized in a standard language). 
The main objective of this paper is to address the following research questions: What 
are the concepts and relations that need to be present in a core security ontology? 
And how to make this ontology easy for requirements engineers to use?  This 
ontology should make it possible to: (a) Create a generic platform of different security 
concepts (threats, risks, requirements, etc.). (b) Create a source of reusable knowledge 
for the elicitation of security requirements in various projects.  
 A Security Ontology for Security Requirements Elicitation 159 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the construction of 
the ontology, its concepts and relationships. Section 3 reports the evaluation of the 
proposed ontology. Related works are presented in Section 4 through a literature 
review. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and describes future work directions. 
2 A Core Security Ontology for Security Requirements 
Engineering 
This section presents the main contribution of this paper, a core security ontology to 
be used particularly for security requirements elicitation process. The method for 
constructing the security ontology is adapted from ontology construction methods 
proposed by Fernandez [25], mixed with key principles of the ones proposed by Jones 
et al. [26]. The construction process contains six main steps: objective, scope, 
knowledge acquisition, conceptualization, implementation, and validation. The 
objective behind the ontology construction must be defined in the beginning, 
including its intended uses, scenarios of use, end-users, etc. The scope stipulates the 
field covered by the ontology. The knowledge acquisition step aims at gathering from 
different sources the knowledge needed for the ontology construction. In the step of 
conceptualization, the knowledge is structured in a conceptual model that contains 
concepts and relationships between them. Ontology implementation requires the use 
of a software environment such as Protégé1; this includes codifying the ontology in a 
formal language (RDF or OWL/XML). Finally, the validation step guarantees that the 
resulting ontology corresponds to what it is supposed to represent. The details about 
how the first five steps were applied to construct our ontology are presented in the 
following sub-sections and the last step is detailed in Section 3.  
2.1 Objective  
The main objective of the target ontology is to provide a generic platform containing 
knowledge about the core concepts related to security (threats, vulnerabilities, 
countermeasures, requirements, etc.). This ontology will be a support for the 
elicitation of security requirements and the development of SRE methods and tools. 
The ontology will be a meta-view for the different security ontologies in the literature. 
It should harmonize the security terminology spread in these ontologies and help 
requirements engineers communicate with each other.  
2.2 Scope of the Ontology 
The ontology covers the security domain in its high level aspects (threats and 
treatments) as well as its organizational ones (security procedures, security 
management process, assets, and persons). The reader will find details on all security 
concepts covered by the ontology in section 2.4.below on. 
                                                          
1
 http://protege.stanford.edu/ 
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2.3 Knowledge Acquisition 
The acquisition of the security knowledge started from standards (e.g. ISO27000). 
Other knowledge acquisition sources were the different security ontologies that exist 
in the literature. We analyzed about 20 security ontologies, based on previous 
literature surveys; the full list of these ontologies can be found in [7] and [8]. These 
ontologies are of various levels (general, specific, for a particular domain). Relevant 
concepts and relationships were extracted through a systematic and syntactic analysis 
of the security ontologies (their concepts and relations). Table 8 in the appendix 
presents part of them (13 ontologies). For the sake of space, we cannot provide the 
reader with the description of all the ontologies used as a source of knowledge for the 
ontology. Brief descriptions of some of them are presented in the following:  
- The ISSRM model [27] (top left in Fig. 1.) was defined after a survey of the risk 
management standards, security related standards, and security management methods. 
The three groups of concepts proposed in the ISSRM model (asset related concepts, 
risk related concepts, and risk treatment related concepts) were used to define the 
three dimensions of the ontology (organization, risk, treatment). 
- Fenz et al. [24] have proposed an ontology to model the information security 
domain. We reused some concepts and relationships of that ontology, in particular the 
ones related to the infrastructure of organizations (assets, organization), the 
relationships between threats and assets, and between threats and vulnerabilities. We 
also reused some standard controls used in Fenz’s ontology to define our security 
requirements.  
- Lashras et al.’s security requirements ontology [12] was useful to define the security 
requirements in our ontology. 
Fig. 1 schematizes the knowledge acquisition step and part of the conceptualization 
phase, starting with the knowledge sources (the different ontologies), the concept  
 
 
Fig. 1. Knowledge acquisition and conceptualization phases 
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alignment, and the conceptualization with the help of experts and documents. The 
concepts of the resulting ontology were derived from the alignments of the different 
security ontologies in the knowledge acquisition step. The knowledge and the 
conceptualization steps were performed manually relying essentially on tables to align 
the concepts and relations of the different source ontologies. 
2.4 Conceptualization 
Based on the outcomes of the knowledge acquisition step, concepts were organized 
and structured in a glossary. Various relationships among these concepts were 
considered, and then were put together in a conceptual model of the ontology (Fig. 4 
in the appendix), easy to understand, independently of any implementation language. 
The names of the concepts and the relationships of the security ontology proposed in 
this paper were chosen according to the number of occurrences of names in the source 
ontologies (Table 8 in the appendix). If a concept has different names in the 
ontologies (e.g. impact or consequence, attack method or deliberate attack, or 
SessionIP attack); the most generic or easiest to understand name was chosen (here, 
impact, attack method). Some security experts (5 experts) were consulted to validate 
the choices that were made. The validation was informal and took the form of email 
exchanges, phone and direct discussions. The experts acknowledged most of the 
concepts and relationships between them. Some refinements in the ontology were 
performed after discussion with them. For example, the concept of “Attack” was 
removed, since the experts consider it as an Intentional Threat. Discussions also 
clarified the difference between the concepts of “Security Goal”, “Security Criterion”, 
“Security Requirement” and “Control”. These concepts are frequently mixed up in the 
security requirements elicitation phase and the difference between them is often not 
easy to capture. The concepts were organized around three main dimensions. The 
latter are: Risk dimension, Treatment dimension, and Organization dimension. In 
ontology engineering terms [45]: the Risk, Treatment and Organization dimensions 
are considered as modules. The Risk dimension represents the “dark” face of security; 
it gathers concepts related to threats, vulnerabilities, attacks, and threat agents. 
Treatment dimension is concerned with concepts related to the necessary treatments 
to overcome risks. The concepts are security goals, requirements, controls, and 
security policies. Finally, security is a multifaceted problem; it is not only about 
technical solutions or single assets, but also about the environment where threats 
appear and arise. That is why the Organization dimension is considered. This 
dimension relates to concepts such as person, location, assets, and organization that 
must be analyzed and on which assumptions must be match in a security requirements 
elicitation process. Some ontologies covered only the dimension treatment [12]. The 
security ontology proposed by Fenz et al. [24] groups concepts into three sets 
(security, enterprise and location). The classification into these three dimensions 
(organization, risk and treatment) helps in organizing the knowledge related to 
security; it has been inspired by the security meta-model proposed in [27]. The 
concepts and relationships of the ontology are described in the following sub-section. 
To visualize the different concepts and relations, the reader may refer to Fig.4. 
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1) Concepts of the Security Ontology 
The following summarizes the different concepts identified for the ontology with their 
respective descriptions. These general concepts together with their relations constitute 
the ontology, which presents an overview of the information security in a context-
independent manner. In the following, we describe the concepts dimension by 
dimension.  
a) Organization dimension: This dimension includes the concepts related to the 
organization, its assets and its environment. The concepts are: 
Organization: a structure including human, hardware, and software resources (assets). 
Person: Represents human agents. A person may be internal in the organization (e.g., 
administrator) or external (e.g., customer).  
Asset: a valuable resource, which can be a tangible asset (e.g., air-conditioning, fire 
extinguisher, computers) or an intangible asset. Intangible assets can be, for example, 
software, data, and industrial manufacturing processes. 
Location: Defines the asset’s location. Location can be a brick and mortar physical 
location such as a classroom, data center or office. It can also consist of collaborative 
research materials on a file share or financial information stored in a database [28]. 
b) Risk dimension:   The concepts of the risk dimension are: 
Risk: a combination of a vulnerability and threat causing harm to one or more asset. 
Severity: the level of risk, e.g. high, medium or low. 
Threat: a violation of a security criterion. The threat may be natural, accidental, or 
intentional (attack). 
Vulnerability: a weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be exploited by one 
or more threats [29] (e.g., weak password). 
Impact: the impact may vary from a simple loss of availability to loss of the entire 
information system control. Impact can also be of other types such as harm to the 
image of the company. 
Threat agent: the person (or program) who carries out the threat. The name ‘threat 
agent’ was chosen to cover both types of threat, either intentional (carried out by an 
attacker) or unintentional (carried out by any person, not necessarily an attacker).  
Attack method: Refers to the different methods used by threat agents to accomplish 
their attacks, such as sniffing (which lets threat agents capture and analyze traffic 
transmitted over a network); spoofing (where the threat agent attempts to impersonate 
someone or something else); and social engineering (tricking people into giving 
sensitive information or performing actions on behalf of the threat agent). 
Attack tool: The tool used to perform the attack, e.g. sniffing tool (e.g., Wireshark2), 
spoofing tool (e.g. Subterfuge3), scan port tool (e.g., Nmap4) and others. 
 
 
                                                          
2
 http://www.wireshark.org/ 
3
 http://code.google.com/p/subterfuge/downloads/list 
4
 http://nmap.org/ 
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c) Treatment dimension: 
Security goal: a security goal defines what a stakeholder/organization hopes to 
achieve in the future in terms of security [27], it states the intention to counter threats 
and satisfy security criteria. Security goals are sometimes considered as security 
objectives [47]. 
Security Requirement: a condition defined on the environment that needs to be 
fulfilled in order to achieve a security goal and mitigate a risk. Depending on what we 
want to protect and on the target security level, we define our requirements. They can 
be related to databases, applications, systems, organizations, and external 
environments. For example, “the system shall ensure that personal data can be 
accessed only by authorized users” and “the system shall deliver data in a manner that 
prevents further or second hand use by unauthorized people”. 
Control: a means or a way to secure assets and enable a security requirement, e.g., 
alarm or password. 
Security criterion: defines security properties such as confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, and traceability. It can also be considered as a constraint on assets. 
Requirements document: The document that states in writing the necessary security 
requirements to protect the assets. Two main documents generally contain security 
requirements: 
- Security policy: a security policy expresses the defense strategy or strategic 
directions of the information security board of an organization. 
- Specification document: it gathers the set of requirements to be satisfied by a 
material, design, product, or service. The document contains, inter alia, security 
requirements. 
2) Relationships of the Security Ontology 
High-level relationships between those concepts were defined. They were categorized 
into four kinds: IsA, HasA, SubClassOf and AssociatedTo. The relationships between 
the concepts of the security ontology can be briefly described as follows: An 
organization has assets (Has_Asset). An asset may have a location (Has_Location). 
Tangible and intangible assets are subclasses of the asset concept (SubClassOf). An 
organization also includes persons that it deals with (Has_Person). The persons can be 
internal or external (SubClassOf). An asset is threatened by one or many threats 
(Threatens). These threats exploit vulnerabilities in the assets (Exploits). The threat-
agent leads an attack (LeadBy) and uses attack methods (UseMethod) or attack tools 
(UseTool) to achieve an attack. A threat implies an impact (Implies), for example: “A 
denial of service attack implies a server downtime”. The impact affects one or more 
assets (Affect). A threat can be natural, intentional, or accidental (SubClassOf). A 
threat generates a risk (Generate) with a certain level of severity (HasSeverity). 
Security requirements mitigate a risk (Mitigate) and satisfy (Satisfy) security goals 
expressed by stakeholders (ExpressedBy). Security requirements fulfill (Fulfills) one 
or more security criteria. For instance, the requirement “The application shall ensure 
that each user will be able to execute actions for which he/she has permission at any 
time/every week” satisfies the security criteria Confidentiality and Availability. 
Controls enable a security requirement (Enable). For example, the control “password” 
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enables the requirement “The application shall ensure that each user will be able to 
execute actions for which he/she has permission”. Security policies and specifications 
incorporate (Includes) security requirements; these may either be security software 
requirements (SubClass), which relate to the security of applications or databases, or 
security organizational requirements (SubClass), which relate to assets, persons, or 
buildings. 
3) Attributes and Axioms of the Security Ontology 
In addition to concepts and relationships, an ontology contains axioms and attributes. 
Formal axioms are assertions accepted as true about abstractions of a field. The 
axioms allow us to define the meaning of concepts, put restrictions on the values of 
attributes, examine the conformity of specified information, or derive new concepts 
[30]. As stated before, the ontology proposed in this paper was not created from 
scratch. It was constructed by reusing knowledge of existing security ontologies. In 
particular, some attributes (see Table 1) of the ontology proposed by [31] were 
reused. For instance, a person has a phone number (its type is Integer); a requirements 
document has a version (its type is String). 
Table 1. Part of the table of attributes 
Concept Attribute Value type
Person Phone number Integer 
Software Version String
   
Requirement 
Document 
Version String
  
Password Minimum length Varchar
 
The ontology proposed by [24] was a good source of axioms. Table 2 illustrates 
some axioms with their descriptions and the related concepts. 
 
Table 2. Part of the table of axioms 
 
Fig. 4 in the appendix presents the security ontology proposed in this paper. It 
includes the three dimensions, including concepts and relationships. 
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2.5 Implementation of the Ontology 
Among the different editors of ontologies (OntoEdit [32], Ontolingua [33] and 
Protégé [34]). Protégé (version 3.4.8) was chosen since it is an extensible, platform-
independent environment for creating, editing, viewing, checking constraints, and 
extracting ontologies and knowledge bases. Ontologies via Protégé can be developed 
in a variety of formats. OWL 1.0 (Web Ontology Language) was used for the 
development of the ontology as recommended by the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C). To test and extract relevant knowledge from the security ontology, SQWRL 
(Semantic Query-Enhanced Web Rule Language) was used. SQWRL is a SWRL-
based (Semantic Web Rule Language) for querying OWL ontologies. The description 
of SQWRL syntax is beyond the scope of the paper; readers may refer to O'Connor et 
al. [35] for further details. Some indicative queries are presented later in the next 
section. Implementing the core security ontology with OWL and Protégé is not 
enough. The target end-users are requirements engineers who are asked to elicit 
security requirements for different projects, on which they have a tacit knowledge. 
The ontology will provide the necessary security knowledge in a formalized and 
explicit form. It also makes available a set of reusable security requirements. To make 
it usable even for end users not familiarized with Protégé and SQWRL, an interactive 
environment based on Eclipse was developed. Fig. 2 illustrates the architecture of the 
tool. The interactive environment facilitates the exploration of the ontology. It 
automatically and dynamically generates the necessary. SQWRL queries and rules for 
obtaining the information related to assets, organization, threats, vulnerabilities, and 
security requirements. The interactive environment makes it possible to generate a 
specification (a Word document) that summarizes the result of the analysis. Protégé 
plays the role of the engine; it is intended to wait for SQWRL queries (it plays a 
passive role in the communication with the end user). Once a query is received,  
 
 
Fig. 2. Architecture of the interactive environment 
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Protégé processes it and then sends the result to the interactive environment. With this 
architecture, Protégé is opaque to the requirements engineers; i.e., the requirements 
engineers do not interact directly with it.  
A screenshot of the user interface is presented in Fig. 3. In particular, this figure 
presents part of the interface; a typical security requirements analysis process was 
performed, with 3 main windows: valuable asset identification (on the left side), risk 
analysis, and security requirements elicitation (on the right side).  
 
  
Fig. 3. A screenshot of the interactive environment5 
The interactive environment allows the user to choose the organization. It displays 
the persons involved and the list of all assets with their corresponding locations. It 
also allows the user to choose valuable assets that he/she wants to protect. The latter 
are displayed on the left. For each asset the environment displays the corresponding 
threats (threat agents, impact and generated risk of each threat). For each chosen 
threat, the environment displays the corresponding vulnerabilities. And finally, for all 
chosen vulnerabilities, the resulting list of security requirements to mitigate them is 
presented. The “Save” button leads to the generation of the specification document 
that summarizes the analysis and the relevant security requirements.  
3 Evaluation  
Given that our goal was to develop an ontology covering the high-level concepts of 
security, and make it (re)usable by the requirements engineering community, the 
focus was on the following criteria: 
                                                          
5
 A demonstration video can be viewed at: http://youtu.be/zwGbe0Z_mTE 
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• Completeness: this criterion will be evaluated by mapping the target ontology and 
some other ontologies extracted from literature. The focus was mainly on security 
ontologies that have been used in security requirements engineering [9][10][11][12]. 
• Validity: Through this criterion, the ability of the ontology to provide reliable 
answers to a set of questions using its terminology was checked. 
• Usability: This criterion refers to the “extent to which a product can be used by 
specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and 
satisfaction in a specified context of use"6. In our case, it demonstrates that the 
ontology can be used for security requirements elicitation, and reused through 
different projects.  
3.1 Completeness  
The completeness criterion verifies that our ontology integrates the knowledge that 
exists in the other ontologies. By completeness, we want to prove that the proposed 
ontology is ‘more’ complete than the ones covered by our literature. An alignment 
table was drawn up, with the concepts of our ontology on one side, and concepts of 
security ontologies found in security requirements engineering literature on the other 
side. Table 3 presents the result of the alignment. 
 
Table 3. The alignment table of the proposed security ontology with ontologies used for 
security requirements elicitation 
Ontologies used for security requirements elicitation 
Concepts of 
the ontology 
Daramola et 
al. [11] 
Ivankina et al. 
[10] 
Lashras et al. 
[12]  
Salini et al. 
[13]  
Dritsas et al. 
[14] 
Asset Asset Asset Asset Asset Asset 
Location - - - - - 
Organization - - - - - 
Person 
- - - Stakeholder Stakeholder 
Threat Threat/ 
Active attack - Threat Threat 
Threat/ 
Deliberate 
attack 
Vulnerability - Threat causes - Vulnerability Vulnerability 
 Risk  - - Risk - - 
Severity 
- - 
Valuation 
criteria - - 
Impact - - - Impact severity - 
Threat agent - - - - Attacker 
Attack tool - - - - - 
Attack 
method 
Code 
injection - - - - 
Security goal - - - - Objective 
Security 
criterion - - - Security objective 
Security 
requirement 
Security 
requirement - Treatment 
Security 
requirement 
Security 
requirement - 
Control 
- - Safe guard - Countermeasure 
                                                          
6
 According to: ISO 9241-11.   
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Most of the security ontologies used in the SRE contain the concept of “Asset”. 
Given that security issues affect all the infrastructure of organizations, other concepts 
were introduced (with their corresponding sub-classes): Location, Organization and 
Person. While many of the other security ontologies take into consideration the 
concept Threat, most of them neglect the concept Risk generated by a threat, and its 
Severity. Only the ontology proposed by Dritsas et al. [14] uses the concept of 
“Attacker”. Only the ontology used by Daramola et al. [11] includes the concept of 
“Attack Method”. Our proposed security ontology covers the concept “Objective” 
used by Dritsas et al. [13]. The concept “Security Criterion”, missing in the security 
ontologies [11], [10] and [12] was used in [13] and [14]. Note that [14] considers as a 
‘security requirement’ what other sources consider a ‘security criterion’ (availability, 
confidentiality ...).  The concept “Security Requirement” was used in [10], [12] and 
[13]. These results tend to demonstrate that the proposed security ontology is 
complete with respect to the union of all the other security ontologies used in security 
requirements studies, since it incorporates all their concepts. 
3.2 Validity  
According to Uschold & Gruninger [36], informal and formal questions are one way 
to evaluate an ontology. The ontology must be able to give reliable answers to these 
questions using its terminology. The ontology was applied to the maritime domain. 
For now, the application for domain specific cases is done manually, by instantiating 
the concepts of the core ontology with domain concepts. Ongoing work is being 
carried to automatize this instantiation. 
This section lists a number of questions that a requirements engineer is likely to 
encounter during the requirements elicitation phase of a development project. These 
questions should be regarded as indicative of what the ontology can deal with and 
reason about. Table 4 summarizes some of these questions. Each of the questions is 
expressed informally in natural language and formally using SQWRL. The answers to 
the questions are presented in the last column. These queries guide the requirements 
engineer during the security requirements elicitation process. The process includes: i) 
valuable assets identification (what are the assets of the organization? Where are they 
located? What are the persons involved in the organization?), ii) the risk analysis 
(what are the threats that threaten the asset? Who leads the attack? What is the  
attack method used?), and iii) security requirements elicitation (what are the  
security requirements to mitigate the risk? What are the controls needed to implement 
those security requirements? What are the security criteria that those requirements 
fulfill?) 
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Table 4. Informal and formal questions to the ontology 
 Queries Part of result 
V
al
ua
bl
e 
a
ss
et
 
id
en
tif
ic
a
tio
n
 
What are the organizations in the scope of the project? Maritime organization X,  
Maritime organization Y 
 
Organization(?o)  sqwrl:select(?o)
What are the assets to be protected in the maritime organization X? What is 
the location of each asset?  
Ship, Navigation 
maps 
located in the bridge Has_Asset(Maritime_organizationX,?a) •  
Has_Location(?a, ?l)  
sqwrl:select(?a, ?l) 
R
isk
 
a
n
a
ly
sis
 
What are threats that threaten the asset “ship”? Ship hijacking 
threatens(?T,Ship)  sqwrl:select(?T) 
Who is responsible for the threat “Ship hijacking”? Hijacker 
LedBy(Ship_hijacking,?A)sqwrl:select( 
?A) 
What is the method used by the hijacker to attract the ship? Fake distress signal  
Threat(Ship_hijacking)•Uses(Hijacker,?M)  
sqwrl:select (?M) 
What are the impacts of such a threat on the ship? Theft of provision, 
Hostage Implies(Ship_hijacking,?I) sqwrl:select(?I) 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
re
qu
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What are the security requirements to consider to mitigate the risk? Req1. 
Every Ship 
should be 
equipped 
with geolocalization 
products. 
Req2. 
Every Ship 
should be 
equipped 
with a 
listening 
system on 
board.
 
Exploits (Ship hijacking, V?) • mitigated_by(?V, 
?R) sqwrl:select(?r) 
 
This section has demonstrated how the security ontology could be exploited in the 
security requirements elicitation phase. This can bring the necessary knowledge to the 
requirements engineers. This sub-section has illustrated one possible application in 
the maritime field. 
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3.3 Usability  
To evaluate the usability of the core security ontology, a controlled experiment was 
performed with end users. The protocol of the experiment was adapted from 
experimental design and analysis methods [42][43]. In order to obtain a representative 
group of participants [37], we contacted by mail and phone people from security and 
requirements engineering communities (laboratories, associations, LinkedIn…). 
People (industrialists or researchers) not related to the field were intentionally 
excluded. We used the profile page, and the job position to include/exclude a 
participant. The day of the experiment, 10 participants were present. The average age 
was 30 years old. Three participants were certified ISO27000, and three had industrial 
experience with EBIOS [38] (a well-known French risk assessment method). Four 
were PhD students working on related subjects. The experiment included a 
presentation of the security ontology (its main concepts and relations), demonstration 
of the interactive environment, and a session of manipulation by the participants. At 
the end of the experiment, participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire7. The 
results extracted from these questionnaires are summed up in Tables 5, 6, 7. 
Table 5. Average grading usability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, the participants were asked to grade the usability of the ontology on a scale 
of 1 to 5 through three main questions:  (i) Do you find that the security ontology 
contains the main concepts for security requirements elicitation? (ii) Does the 
security ontology help in finding new elements (threats, vulnerabilities, security 
requirements, etc.)? (iii) Do you find the interface to access to security ontology easy 
to use? The scale (1 to 5) corresponds to the degree of agreement to the asked 
question. Thus (5 = strongly agree, 4 = agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 2= 
disagree, 1= strongly disagree). Table 5 (page 12) shows a quite high level of 
satisfaction, which is encouraging. Most participants find that the security ontology 
includes the main concepts. It helps in discovering new elements even for those who 
are experts in security since it is not easy to bear in mind hundreds of threats, 
                                                          
7
 The questionnaire can be consulted on: 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/cc40n31p3fucf4o/Sec%20Ont%20Evaluation
%20form.pdf?dl=0 
4,3 4,2 4,5
0
1
2
3
4
5
i ii iii
(i) Concepts 
(ii) Discovering 
new elements 
(iii) Interface 
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vulnerabilities, and their corresponding security requirements. Almost all participants 
liked the interactive environment, and revealed that is nice to have the code of the 
ontology (in OWL-Protégé) hidden.  Among the positive qualitative feedbacks that 
were provided by participants:  "I find in the ontology all concepts that are used in 
risk analysis methods such as EBIOS". One participant mentioned that: “The ontology 
seems to have main concepts and individuals, however it would be nice to update it 
constantly, there are new threats appearing every day!”. That was an interesting point 
that could be improved in the future by providing a mechanism to update 
automatically the individuals of the security ontology.  
The second series of questions were particularly devoted to the next stages of the 
research project and their answers constitute an important input for future work. The 
participants were asked: (iv) Does the core security ontology help in building security 
models? Secure Tropos models [39] were taken as an example of a security modeling 
framework.  It was presented to participants who did not know it before.  
 
 
Table 6 reports the results for question (iv). Most participants find it difficult to 
pass from the concepts of the core security ontology to the concepts of Secure Tropos. 
A common answer was: "We understand the existence of connections but the mapping 
from the core security ontology to Secure Tropos is not straightforward". The 
discussion with participants that followed this question shows that, although the 
security ontology has the main concepts, relations and individuals, this is still not 
enough for users to build security models with it. More guidelines or mapping rules 
are necessary, not for the ontology itself but for the process of using it for security 
requirements elicitation. The last question was: (v) does the security ontology help in 
eliciting security requirements for other specific domains (health, military, and 
bank)? We wanted to know if the security ontology helps in providing more security 
domain specific knowledge each time one switches from a domain to another one.  
Table 7 reports results for question (v) and shows that most participants “disagree” on 
the fact that the security ontology by itself is sufficient for eliciting security 
Table 6. Does the core security ontology 
help in building Secure Tropos models?  
Table 7. Does the security ontology 
help in eliciting security requirements 
for other specific domains?
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requirements for different specific domains. One participant mentioned “something 
additional is required for the application to different specific domains”. The ontology 
can be used in different application contexts with some extra collaboration with 
domain experts, consulting documentation. On the current research phases, we are 
trying to make the process automatic by using the core security ontology with 
different domain ontologies.   
4 Security Ontologies: Related Works 
Considerable works have been devoted to knowledge in the field of security. 
Schumacher [46] proposed a security ontology and qualifies it as “Core Ontology”. 
This ontology was a good beginning but omits organizational related concepts and 
some other key concepts such as attack method and attack tool, or security criteria and 
controls. Undercoffer et al. [17] propose an ontology that characterizes the domain of 
computer attacks and intrusions. The ontology covers concepts such as host, system 
component attack, input and consequence. Geneiatakis and Lambrinoudakis [18] 
propose an ontology for SIP-VoIP (Session Initial Protocol-VoIP) based services. 
Denker et al. [19][20] develop several ontologies for security annotations of agents 
and web services, using DAML (DARPA Agent Markup Language) and later OWL. 
Karyda et al. [21] present a security ontology for e-government applications. Tsoumas 
et al. [22] define a security ontology using OWL and propose the security framework 
of an information system which provides security acquisition and knowledge 
management. Herzog et al. [23] propose an ontology based on the following top-level 
concepts: assets, threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures. Some approaches 
considered modeling security ontologies such as [48]. To our knowledge, ontologies 
of this kind come close to being meta-models, in that they are used more to share a 
common understanding of the structure of the modelling language than to enable 
reuse of knowledge. Fenz and Ekelhart [24] propose an ontology that targets a similar 
goal but attempts to cover a broader spectrum: their ontology models the information 
security domain, including non-core concepts such as the infrastructure of 
organizations. A large part of these studies deal with the development of low-level 
ontologies limited to a particular domain. A previous survey [7] classifies the existing 
security ontologies into eight main families: theoretical basis, security taxonomies, 
general, specific, risk based, web oriented, requirements related and modeling. The 
analysis of these ontologies reveals that they vary a lot in the way they cover security 
aspects as reported in previous work [7]. The results converge with those of Blanco et 
al. who conducted a systematic review of security ontologies [8].  
5 Conclusion and Future Work 
This paper presents a core ontology for the IS security requirements elicitation and 
analysis process. The completeness of this ontology was evaluated with regards to 
existing security ontologies used in security requirements engineering methods. An 
interactive environment was developed to facilitate its use and reuse. The controlled 
experiment demonstrated that the ontology helps requirements engineers in eliciting 
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security requirements by allowing them to exploit security-structured knowledge. 
This was made possible via the interactive environment that dynamically generates 
the necessary queries. Despite all this effort, the goal of constructing this kind of 
security ontologies remains ambitious and was found to be more complex than 
expected. One single team’s work is not enough. This research should be of a more 
collaborative nature including many teams working on security ontologies. A truly 
complete security ontology remains a utopian goal. However, in the case of this 
proposed ontology, it can be improved by considering other sources related to security 
expertise (not mainly ontologies as was the case in this work). The controlled 
experiment could be performed with a larger number of participants to improve the 
validity of the results.   
In future work, we plan to integrate the ontology and its reasoning features with 
existing approaches for security requirements analysis (Secure Tropos, KAOS, and 
others). We plan to make this security ontology more domains-specific by relying on 
domain ontologies. On the technical level, the plan is to keep the ontology up to date 
and perform the necessary migrations to the latest available versions (OWL/Protégé). 
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Appendix 
 
Fig. 4 in the appendix presents the core security ontology. Table 8 in the appendix 
was built up for ontology concepts definition. It includes the ontologies used as an 
entrance point. 
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